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It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as
a very natural solution to the problem of de￿ning social preferences
over distributions of a ￿xed bundle of divisible goods. The paper
follows an approach to preference aggregation which relies only on
interpersonally non-comparable preferences, and circumvents Arrow￿s
impossibility by taking account of the shape of indiﬀerence curves.
Social preferences can then be constructed and justi￿ed with fairness
principles.
JEL Classi￿cation: D63, D71.
Keywords: social welfare, social choice, fairness, egalitarian-equivalence.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a seminal paper, Pazner and Schmeidler [9] proposed a concept of equity,
￿egalitarian-equivalence￿, that was diﬀerent from the standard no-envy crite-
rion, and relied on the idea that all individuals should be put in a situation
that is Pareto-indiﬀerent (i.e., indiﬀerent for all individuals) to a perfectly
egalitarian allocation. Although their idea has been applied in many parts
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1of the theory of fair allocation, it has not been as in￿uential as it could have,
for two reasons. First, the concept of egalitarian-equivalence has been, like
most of the theory of fair allocation, restricted to the search for equitable
￿rst-best allocations and has not been translated into tools for addressing is-
sues of second-best allocation and cost-bene￿t analysis. Second, it has often
attracted the criticism that it is too vague, since in the presence of several
goods, there are many ways in which the egalitarian allocation (to which all
individuals should be indiﬀerent) can be determined. Pazner and Schmeidler
themselves proposed to look for an egalitarian bundle that would be pro-
portional to the total consumption, but this particular choice was not really
justi￿ed. Since then a suspicion of arbitrariness has always surrounded this
concept. It is only very recently that Pazner￿s and Schmeidler￿s particular
choice of the egalitarian bundle has been axiomatically justi￿ed, by Spru-
mont and Zhou [10]. Nonetheless, their remarkable result only deals with
￿rst-best allocation rules, and moreover relies on an axiom of solidarity that
is commonly considered demanding, in the ￿eld of fair allocation.1
In several recent papers (in particular [2], [3]), Fleurbaey and Maniquet
have shown that the theory of fair allocation can be extended so as to provide
full-￿edged rankings of allocations, and not only selections of small subsets
of ￿rst-best allocations. The main feature of our approach is that, by tak-
ing account of enough information about individual preferences, one is able
to de￿ne social preferences and circumvent Arrow￿s impossibility theorem,
thanks to relaxing his restrictive condition of Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives.2 Such social preferences aggregate individual (ordinal and non-
comparable) preferences and satisfy valuable properties related to principles
of eﬃciency, impartiality and equity. This new approach makes it possible
to think about direct applications to second-best allocation problems and
cost-bene￿ta n a l y s i s .
What do the social preferences obtained in this way look like? In [2]
and [3] Fleurbaey and Maniquet provided several results which give support
to two diﬀerent kinds of social preferences. One is related to the concept of
Walrasian equilibrium, whereas the other is directly inspired from Pazner￿s
and Schmeidler￿s concept of ￿egalitarian-equivalent￿ allocations, and is called
1Their axiom requires that all individuals gain or lose when the population size and/or
the preferences change. They show in particular that assuming separately solidarity w.r.t.
population changes and solidarity w.r.t. preference changes would not do.
2Why this condition can legitimately be relaxed is explained at length in Fleurbaey
and Maniquet [3]. See Section 7 below for a de￿nition and a short discussion.
2the Pazner-Schmeidler ordering in the sequel. Both are precisely de￿ned later
on in this paper. In a nutshell, the Pazner-Schmeidler ordering gives priority
to any individual who has the worst position, and such an individual is
determined as the one who would accept to exchange his bundle for the lowest
share of the total available resources. The Walrasian ordering also gives
priority to some individuals, namely those who would willingly exchange their
bundle for the lowest share of the total available resources, if the latter was
used as an initial endowment for competitive trades at some relevant prices.
(These prices are chosen so that this lowest share is the highest possible.)
In this paper, I propose an additional defense of the Pazner-Schmeidler
ordering, pursuing with the same method of construction of full-￿edged social
preferences over allocations. My defense is based on the idea that it is quite
appealing to apply egalitarian principles to allocations in which individual
bundles are all proportional to each other and to the total available resources.
On this basis one is inevitably led to consider the Pazner-Schmeidler ordering
as the most justi￿ed.
In the next section the framework is presented and the Pazner-Schmeidler
ordering is de￿ned. Section 3 is devoted to the leading idea of this paper, and
contains preliminary results that serve as a basis for four characterizations
developed in the four following sections (from 4 to 7). The last two sections
(7 and 8) discuss the results and conclude. The proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The Pazner-Schmeidler ordering
Following the literature (Pazner and Schmeidler [9], Sprumont and Zhou
[10], among many others), this paper deals with the canonical problem of
distributing a ￿xed bundle Ω ∈ R‘
++ of ‘ goods (‘ ≥ 2)t on individuals
(n ≥ 2). Every individual i = 1,...,n has a preference ordering Ri over R‘
+,
which is assumed here to be monotonic (xi ≥ yi implies xi Ri yi and xi ￿ yi
implies xi Pi yi)3 and continuous. Let R denote the set of such orderings.
(Convexity of preferences could also be required without altering the results.)
An allocation is a list of bundles, one for each agent: x =( x1,...,xn) ∈
Rn‘
+ . A social ordering function (SOF) is a mapping which, for every economy
de￿ned by a number n ≥ 1, ap r o ￿le (R1,...,Rn) ∈ Rn and a bundle Ω ∈ R‘
++,
3Vector inequalities are denoted ≥,>,￿ .
3determines a (social) ordering4 over the set of allocations Rn‘
+.
Pazner and Schmeidler [9] proposed to select allocations which are Pareto-
optimal, and such that every individual i is indiﬀerent between his bundle and
a particular bundle proportional to Ω, that is, such that for some real number
λ, one has xi Ii λΩ for all i. As they themselves mention in their paper,
notably in the proof of the existence of ￿egalitarian-equivalent￿ allocations,
this solution to the distribution problem can also be described by referring
to the following SOF, denoted RPS :





where vi is a representation of i￿s preferences de￿ned by:
vi(xi)=m i n {υ | υΩ Ri xi}.
This SOF can be re￿ned by replacing its maximin form by the lexico-
graphic re￿nement of maximin, also called leximin. This yields a SOF which
satis￿es stronger versions of the Pareto principle in particular. But we will
not focus on such re￿nements here, because for all practical purposes, the
maximin criterion is enough. That is, in most conceivable applications, the
maximin version of the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF presented here determines a
unique, or essentially unique, best allocation. All re￿nements of the Pazner-
Schmeidler SOF are then practically equivalent to it, and do not provide any
better selection. For later purposes, let say that an ordering R0 re￿nes an
ordering R whenever for any pair of allocations x,y,
xR
0y ⇒ xRy.
3 The basic idea
Because the problem is to distribute a bundle Ω, it is quite natural to focus
on allocations which are proportional distributions of this bundle. Let us
say that allocation x is proportional to Ω whenever for all i, xi = λiΩ for
some non-negative real number λi. F o rs u c ha na l l o c a t i o n ,l e tmini xi denote
(mini λi)Ω.
If equality of shares is retained as a guiding principle, then it is tempting
to apply it to allocations proportional to Ω, in the sense of the maximin
criterion. Namely, this would amount to the following property:
4An ordering is a re￿exive, transitive and complete binary relation.
4Maximin for Proportional Allocations: If x and y are two allocations





yi ⇒ xPy .
Another condition one would like to see satis￿ed by a social ordering is
the Pareto criterion, which will be retained in its weak version here:
Weak Pareto: If x and y are such that for all i, xi Pi yi, then xPy .
Now, the combination of these two axioms lead us directly to the Pazner-
Schmeidler SOF, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Any SOF which satis￿es Weak Pareto and Maximin for Propor-
tional Allocations is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF or a re￿nement.
This basic result paves the way for a series of characterizations, below,
that exploit the fact that Maximin for Proportional Allocations, arguably
quite demanding and restrictive, is actually not very hard to justify with
more elementary axioms. This is the topic of the next sections.
An additional point worth being mentioned is that under a continuity
requirement the above lemma can be strengthened. Continuity of the social
ordering is a convenient property in applications where optimization over a
c o m p a c ts u b s e to fa l l o c a t i o n si sp e r f o r m e d .
Continuity: For all economies, the social ordering is continuous.
Lemma 2 The Pazner-Schmeidler SOF is the only one satisfying Weak
Pareto, Maximin for Proportional Allocations and Continuity.
4F i r s t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
A ￿rst idea is to rely on the theorems that characterize the maximin or the
leximin in the theory of social choice. In particular, Hammond￿s [6] concept
of equity can be adapted here quite naturally. His initial formulation had
to do with comparable welfare levels, and said that it is socially acceptable
to reduce the inequality of utilities between two individuals, by increasing
the worse-oﬀ￿s utility and decreasing the better-oﬀ￿s utility. Here we deal
5with bundles and preferences, not with utilities, but if one is interested in
the egalitarian sharing of resources, the same idea can be applied to bun-
dles of commodities whenever they are unambiguously comparable. This is
indeed the case for allocations proportional to Ω, since all bundles are then
comparable by vector inequalities.
Hammond Equity for Proportional Allocations: If x and y are two al-
locations proportional to Ω, such that for two agents i and j,
yi >x i >x j >y j,
whereas for all other agents k, xk = yk, then xRy .
Notice that, from Fleurbaey and Trannoy [4], it can be deduced that such
an axiom must be written for allocations proportional to one vector Ω only,
and would be incompatible with Weak Pareto if it were required to hold for
more than one vector (more precisely, for more than one direction in the
space of goods). If one has to choose only one direction in the space of goods
to formulate such a condition, the direction de￿ned by Ω is certainly the
most appealing.
Tungodden [13] has recently shown that, if one is interested in the max-
imin criterion and not in the leximin re￿nement, then Hammond Equity can
be weakened substantially, and be replaced with something like the following
axiom. This axiom says that it is enough to focus on the worst-oﬀ and the
best-oﬀ agents in the whole population. If the inequality between the sub-
groups of worst-oﬀ and best-oﬀ agents is reduced, while these agents remain
the worst-oﬀ and the best-oﬀ, then the situation is not considered worsened.
Let W(x) and B(x) denote the subgroups of worst-oﬀ agents and best-oﬀ
agents in an allocation x proportional to Ω :
W(x)={i | xi =m i n
j
xj}
B(x)={i | xi =m a x
j
xj}
Minimal Equity for Proportional Allocations I: If x and y are two al-
locations proportional to Ω, with W(x)=W(y) and B(x)=B(y), and
such that
∀i ∈ W(x),y i <x i
∀i ∈ B(x),y i >x i,
whereas for all agents k outside W(x) ∪ B(x),x k = yk, then xRy .
6Another possible weakening of Hammond Equity, inspired by some other
axioms proposed by Tungodden, is exempli￿ed by the next axiom. In words,
the next axiom says that if there is one worst-oﬀ agent and one best-oﬀ
agent, then it is socially acceptable to reduce the inequality between the two,
provided the best-oﬀ is not pulled down below the mean, which is denoted,




Minimal Equity for Proportional Allocations II: If x and y are two
allocations proportional to Ω, with B(y)={i} and W(y)={j}, and
such that
yi >x i > max{￿(x),￿(y)} ≥ min{￿(x),￿(y)} >x j >y j,
whereas for all other agents k, xk = yk, then xRy .
It is easy to check that these two axioms are logically implied by Ham-
mond Equity. Combining Tungodden￿s results and the above lemma, one
gets the following result, whose proof is given for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 1 Any SOF which satis￿es Weak Pareto and Minimal Equity for
Proportional Allocations (I or II) is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF or a re-
￿nement. Under the additional requirement of Continuity it is the Pazner-
Schmeidler SOF.
5 Second characterization
A variant of the above idea is to use the Hammond Equity condition at a more
general level, relying on an axiom proposed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [3].
This condition applies to individuals with identical preferences, when they
agree that one of them has a strictly better bundle than the other, and this
inequality is reduced, in particular by giving a better bundle to the one who
has the worse bundle. The appeal of this axiom is rather obvious, and can
be related to the idea of a Rawlsian priority given to the agents who have the
worst bundles, when there is agreement among concerned individuals about
how bundles should be ranked. It can also be justi￿ed on grounds of reducing
the intensity of envy, since the agent with the worse bundle envies the other
one, while the other does not envy him.
7Maximin Treatment of Equals: If x and y are two allocations, and i and
j are two agents with identical preferences denoted R0,s u c ht h a t
yi P0 xi P0 xj P0 yj,
whereas for all other agents k, xk = yk, then xRy .
We will actually make use here of a much weaker version of this axiom,
in particular allowing for any degree of inequality aversion, in the fashion
of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle extended to multidimensional bundles
as in Fleurbaey and Trannoy [4]. The standard Pigou-Dalton principle says
that in a uni-dimensional setting (individuals are described by their income,
for instance), it is socially acceptable to transfer a given amount of resource
from one agent to another who is poorer, if the transfer does not reverse the
ranking. This can be extended to multi-dimensional bundles by considering
a transfer of a part of a bundle which has more of all goods than another
bundle.
Again, Fleurbaey and Trannoy [4] show that the multi-dimensional Pigou-
Dalton principle should not be applied to individuals with diﬀerent prefer-
ences, because of a resulting incompatibility with Weak Pareto. Restricting
its application to individuals with identical preferences avoids this problem.
The next axiom, then, says that it is socially acceptable to transfer part of a
bundle from one agent to another when, both ex ante and ex post, the agent
who gives has more of all goods.
Transfer Principle for Equals: If x and y are two allocations, and i and
j are two agents with identical preferences, such that for some δ ￿ 0,
yi − δ = xi ￿ xj = yj + δ,
whereas for all other agents k, xk = yk, then xRy .
The motivation that led to the formulation of the axioms of the previous
sections can now be formulated also in a more general way, as the idea that
proportional allocations can be assessed independently of individual prefer-
ences. This condition can be justi￿ed on grounds of simplicity, or by the
argument that our ethical intuition is ￿rm enough in the case of proportional
allocations, so that we do not have to look at individual preferences. But,
contrary to the axioms of the previous section, this one does not say anything
about the content of social preferences over proportional allocations. They
could be anti-egalitarian.
8Independence of Preferences for Proportional Allocations: If x and
y are two allocations proportional to Ω, and R, R0 are the social order-





One then obtains the following result:
Theorem 2 Any SOF which satis￿es Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle for
Equals and Independence of Preferences for Proportional Allocations is the
Pazner-Schmeidler SOF or a re￿nement. Under the additional requirement
of Continuity it is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF.
It is worth emphasizing that none of the axioms involved in this result
implies a positive inequality aversion by itself. It is only when combining
them that a priority for the worst-oﬀ is derived.
6 Third characterization
As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent route can be proposed, which also introduces the in￿-
nite inequality aversion typical of the maximin criterion and related order-
ings, in a quite indirect way.
Let us indeed consider a minimal requirement saying essentially that in-
equality aversion must be non-negative, but arbitrarily low, regarding allo-
cations proportional to Ω. That is, equalizing a proportional allocation by
giving the average bundle to all agents is socially acceptable. This axiom
is very intuitive, and can be related to a traditional notion of fairness, ac-
cording to which no individual should ever be given less than the average
consumption (Steinhaus [11]). Sprumont and Zhou [10], as well as Fleurbaey
and Maniquet [3], also make use of similar conditions.
Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations: If x and y are








9Another feature of some interesting SOFs is that, when assessing a partic-
ular allocation, they focus on the positions of the various indiﬀerence curves
observed in the economy, without taking account of the size of the subgroups
of the population located at the various positions. This property is satis￿ed
by the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF but also by other interesting SOFs (see next
section). This is not just a feature that relates to informational parsimony,
it also has ethical implications that philosophers (e.g. Par￿t[ 8 ] )d e s c r i b ea s
the precept that in some relevant circumstances, ￿numbers do not count￿.
Saving one individual from a severe predicament is sometimes a priority that
should override a small gain given to aﬄuent people, no matter how numer-
ous they are. This idea that numbers do not count can be formulated as
follows.
Independence of Cloning: Let R denote the social ordering in a partic-
ular economy with n agents, and R0 the social ordering in another
economy derived from the ￿rst one by introducing an additional agent
n + 1 identical to agent i. Then, for any pair of allocations x and y,
xRy⇒ (x1,...,xn,x i)R
0(y1,...,yn,y i).
One can, however, criticize this neglect of numbers as being too demand-
ing. In particular, it is easy to show that it is incompatible with stronger
versions of the Pareto principle, for impartial social orderings. For instance,
reasoning on real numbers (or proportional allocations) for simplicity, the
distribution (1,2) is, for any impartial social ordering, socially equivalent to
(2,1). But cloning the ￿rst agent leads to the distributions (1,1,2) and (2,2,1),
respectively, which should not be considered equivalent. Notice that, nonethe-
less, the maximin criterion itself is indiﬀerent between them. This problem
with the maximin criterion is usually solved by re￿ning it in a lexicographic
way, leading to the leximin criterion. The latter, however, is not continuous,
and, for practical purposes (choosing the best allocation in a compact sub-
set), is in no way superior to the maximin. The Pazner-Schmeidler SOF itself
is of the maximin sort and totally neglects the demographic sizes of social
strata.
We will nonetheless introduce the idea of neglecting numbers, here, in
a less abrupt way, and the condition we will use is fully compatible with
lexicographic re￿nements, and strong versions of the Pareto principle. We
achieve this by combining cloning of agents with increments to initial bundles.
10Incremental Cloning: Let R denote the social ordering in a particular
economy with n agents, and R0 the social ordering in another economy
derived from the ￿rst one by introducing an additional agent n + 1
identical to agent i. Then, for any pair of allocations x and y, and any
bundle b ∈ R‘
++,
xRy⇒ (x1 + b,...,xn + b,xi + b)R
0(y1,...,yn,y i).
One then obtains the following result.
Theorem 3 Any SOF which satis￿es Weak Pareto, Minimal Egalitarian-
ism for Proportional Allocations and Incremental Cloning is the Pazner-
Schmeidler SOF or a re￿nement. Under the additional requirement of Con-
tinuity it is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF.
7 Discussion and fourth characterization
Some light may be shed on the above results, by looking for other SOFs
satisfying diﬀerent combinations of the various axioms. It is immediate to
check that the sets of axioms used in the characterizations are logically inde-
pendent. We will rather focus here on the role played by the various axioms,
as illustrated by other SOFs.
First, the Weak Pareto condition is the only one to imply strict preference
over some allocations. The SOF that is totally indiﬀerent between all alloca-
tions does satisfy all the other axioms. If one is looking for a non-degenerate
SOF, one may consider the SOF Rminmax de￿ned by:





which also satis￿es all axioms except Weak Pareto. (A table at the end of
this discussion recalls all the axioms.)
Second, let us consider an example of SOF for which proportional al-
locations do not play the same important role. The Walrasian SOF RW
introduced by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [2] can be de￿ned by:









11where ui is a money-metric utility function computed as the fraction of the











An equivalent, more graphical, de￿nition, goes by saying that this SOF relies
on the minimal bundle proportional to Ω and contained in the convex hull
of the union of the individual closed upper contour sets. Now, looking at
properties, the Walrasian SOF does not satisfy any of the axioms focussing
on allocations proportional to Ω, but it does satisfy the others: Weak Pareto,
Maximin Treatment of Equals and Independence of Cloning (and the weaker
counterparts of the last two).
Another direction is to abandon the inequality aversion embodied in the
Pazner-Schmeidler SOF. Consider a utilitarian-like SOF RU−PS de￿ned as
follows:







This SOF does satisfy Independence of Preferences for Proportional Alloca-
tions, as well as Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations. It also
satis￿es Weak Pareto, but none of the other axioms. For the Minimal Equity
axioms (I and II), Maximin Treatment of Equals, as well as for Incremental
Cloning, this is not surprising because they involve either a strong inequality
aversion, or a neglect of numbers, that are incompatible with an additive
criterion. It must be noted, however, that no such incompatibility plagues
the axiom of Transfer Principle for Equals. This axiom is indeed satis￿ed
by a more standard utilitarian SOF RU which, for every possible individual
preference relation R, de￿nes a concave utility function UR, and aggregates
over the utilities thus obtained:







This SOF satis￿es Transfer Principle for Equals but not Maximin Treat-
ment of Equals. It is, therefore, only by combination with an axiom fo-
cussing on proportional allocations that Transfer Principle for Equals even-
tually leads to an in￿nite inequality aversion. The SOF RU also satis￿es
Weak Pareto, but none of the other axioms. This discussion is summarized
12in the following table.
RPS Rminmax RW RU−PS RU
Minimal Equity I for P. A.
√ √
Minimal Equity II for P. A.
√ √
Ind. of Pref. for P. A.
√ √ √
Minimal Egalitarianism for P. A.
√ √ √
Weak Pareto
√ √ √ √
Maximin Treatment of Equals
√ √ √
Transfer Principle for Equals





A natural question, now, is whether combining Transfer Principle for
Equals with Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations, instead of
Independence of Preferences for Proportional Allocations, would also push
us in the direction of the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF. Notice that the combina-
tion of Independence of Preferences for Proportional Allocations and Transfer
Principle for Equals, featured in Theorem 2 above, does imply Minimal Egal-
itarianism for Proportional Allocations, so that the question raised has to do
with a strengthening of Theorem 2.
The answer to the question is prima facie negative, since the SOF that
coincides with RPS when there are individuals with identical preferences,
and with RU−PS otherwise, does satisfy Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle for
Equals, and Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations. But this
peculiar SOF is not appealing because it is too sensitive to slight changes in
preferences. In particular, it violates the following condition, due to Hans-
son [7]. It is a weakening of Arrow￿s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(Arrow [1]). While Arrow￿s condition requires social preferences on a pair of
allocations to depend only on individual preferences over this pair, Hansson￿s
condition requires social preferences on a pair of allocations to depend only
on individual closed upper contour sets at these allocations. In other words,
only indiﬀerence curves at the bundles under consideration should matter,
and the rest of the preference relations can be disregarded. This condition
is very appealing because it guarantees that social preferences will not be
sensitive to far-fetched details of the preferences. At the same time, it makes
it possible to take account of relevant features, such as marginal rates of
substitution, which are excluded by Arrow￿s extremely restrictive condition.
13Hansson￿s condition is satis￿ed by all examples of SOFs in the above table,
except RU.
Hansson Independence: Let x and y be two allocations, and R, R0 be
the social orderings for two pro￿les (R1,...,Rn) and (R0
1,...,R0
n) respec-
tively. If for all i, all q ∈ R‘
+,
xi Ii q ⇔ xi I
0
i q






Now, if one adds this condition to the list, then the Pazner-Schmeidler
SOF is remarkably singled out once more.
Theorem 4 Any SOF which satis￿es Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle for
Equals, Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations and Hansson
Independence is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF or a re￿nement. Under the
additional requirement of Continuity it is the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF.
This characterization is the most striking of the four provided here, be-
cause two important features of the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF are introduced
in a very indirect way: the in￿nite inequality aversion, and the focus on
proportional allocations. In￿nite inequality aversion is not present in either
Transfer Principle for Equals, Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Al-
locations or Hansson Independence, which are, separately, compatible with
indiﬀerence to inequality. And of all axioms provided here about proportional
allocations, Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations is the least
constraining with respect to the focus on proportional allocations, since it al-
lows a wide array of rankings of proportional allocations, with such rankings
possibly depending on individual preferences in complex ways.
8C o n c l u s i o n
The main point of the paper is that the Pazner-Schmeidler SOF can easily
be defended in the simple distribution problem, if one accepts the idea that
allocations proportional to the bundle to be distributed deserve a special
status in the analysis.
14In addition, this paper provides a new illustration of the approach pro-
posed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [2] in order to construct social preferences
on the basis of individual preferences. By relaxing Arrow￿s Independence
and replacing it by Hansson Independence, it is de￿nitely possible to ￿nd
social preferences which satisfy not only Weak Pareto and minimal condi-
tions of impartiality such as Arrow￿s non-dictatorship axiom, but also many
appealing principles of fairness. The axiomatic method is not always well
considered, in particular because of its propensity to endlessly produce ax-
ioms and impossibility results. But the impression that should be retained
here is that, although there is certainly no limit to the formulation of ap-
pealing equity principles, it is reassuring that the results consistently point
toward a very small (but strictly positive!) number of solutions.
Another methodological lesson that may be drawn here is that it appears
simpler to defend the Pazner-Schmeidler ￿rst-best solution to the distribution
problem (that is, the egalitarian-equivalent allocation rule) on the basis of the
related social ordering, than directly. As explained in the introduction, it is
only recently that Sprumont and Zhou [10] have axiomatically characterized
the Pazner-Schmeidler ￿rst-best allocation rule, and these authors stress, in
an implicit criticism of the Pazner-Schmeidler allocation rule, that the axioms
involved in their result look rather restrictive (requiring solidarity of agents
with respect to changes in both preferences and size of the population). That
the analysis of the ordering is simpler than the analysis of the allocation rule
is not very surprising, since the egalitarian-equivalent allocation is naturally
constructed as the maximal element of this simple social ordering.
In contrast, one can compare the rather complex result of Fleurbaey and
Maniquet [3] with respect to the Walrasian social ordering function RW,r e -
lying in particular on an axiom that bears on the allocation rule derived from
the social ordering, to the simple and elegant characterizations of the Wal-
rasian allocation rule obtained by Gevers [5], Thomson [12], among others.
For the Walrasian case it seems simpler to focus on the allocation rule rather
than on the social preferences.
These comparisons suggest that the theory of fair allocation should be
￿exible and consider the analysis of allocation rules and the analysis of social
preferences as two complementary branches of the same important enterprise:
Formulating precise expressions of fairness principles and deriving appealing
solutions to con￿icts of interests. This ecumenical conclusion has, however,
a caveat: Fine-grained social preferences are more powerful tools than ￿rst-
best allocation rules when the latter cannot be implemented and one has to
15fall back on second-best solutions.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:L e tR be a SOF satisfying the two axioms. It is enough
to show that xRyimplies xR PS y, or, equivalently, that yP PS x implies
yPx .Assume, then, that x and y are two allocations such that yP PS x.
Let
ε =
mini vi(yi) − mini vi(xi)
10
.






i =( vi(yi) − ε)Ω.
By construction, for all i, x0
i Pi xi and yi Pi y0
i. So that, by Weak Pareto,
x0 Pxand yPy 0.
Moreover, miniy0
i > mini x0
i, so that by Maximin for Proportional Allo-
cations, y0 Px 0.
By transitivity, then, yPx .






vi(yi) ⇒ xIy .
Let x be an allocation such that mini vi(xi) > 0. Let α =m i n i vi(xi). And










for all i. And let x∞
i = limk→∞ xk
i = αΩ. By Weak Pareto, for all k, x P xk,
so that by Continuity, xRx ∞.










for all i. One has limk→∞ yk = x∞. By the previous lemma, for all k, yk Px ,
so that by Continuity, x∞ Rx .In conclusion, xIx ∞.
Now, consider another allocation x such that mini vi(xi)=0 . Let xk
be a sequence of allocations with mini vi(xk
i) > 0 for all k a n ds u c ht h a t












By the above argument, one has xk Ix k∞ for all k. By continuity, one then
has xIx ∞∞, where x∞∞
i =0for all i.











vi(yi) ⇒ xIy .
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :In view of the lemmas, it is enough to prove that
Weak Pareto and Minimal Equity for Proportional Allocations (I or II) imply
Maximin for Proportional Allocations. Let x and y be two allocations, such
that minixi > mini yi.
Minimal Equity I:L e tα =m i n i xi − mini yi. De￿ne a new allocation
y0 as follows. For all i ∈ W(y),y 0
i = yi + α/10. For all i/ ∈ W(y),y 0
i =
maxj xj +m a x j yj. By Weak Pareto, y0 Py .
One has W(y0)=W(y) and B(y0)={1,...,n}\W(y). Construct allo-
cation z as follows. For all i ∈ W(y),z i = yi + α/5. For all i/ ∈ W(y),
zi = yi + α/2. By Minimal Equity I, zRy 0, so that by transitivity, zPy .
Now, by Weak Pareto, xPz .As a consequence, xPy .
Minimal Equity II:D e ￿ne a new allocation y0 such that for all i, y0
i Pi yi
and there is m such that W(y0)={m}, and M such that W(y0)={M}.


























By Minimal Equity II, y00 Ry 0, and by Weak Pareto y0 Py ,so that y00 Py .
Notice that, by suitably choosing y0 and y00, it is possible to have y00 arbitrarily
18close to the allocation y1 such that y1
i = yi for all i except one j such that





By a similar reasoning it is possible to construct an allocation strictly
preferred to y and arbitrarily close to y2 de￿ned by y2
i = y1
i for all i except
one j such that y1































By iteration, one can construct an allocation strictly preferred to y and
with all individual bundles arbitrarily close to mini yi. S u c ha na l l o c a t i o nc a n
then be chosen with all bundles less than mini xi. Then, by Weak Pareto and
transitivity, one concludes that xPy .







Step 1. We will rely on the following fact: One can go from y to x by a
sequence of proportional allocations z1,...,zT such that z1 = y, zT = x, and
for all t = 1,...,T − 1, either (case 1) z
t+1
i Pi zt
i for all i,o r( c a s e2 )f o rt w o




















The proof of this fact is as follows. Let m be such that ym =m i n i yi,










Let T = |S| +2 . At every step t = 1,...,T − 2, let z
t+1
i = zt
m +2 εΩ for some
agent i ∈ S, while for all k 6= i, z
t+1
k = zt
k+εΩ. In particular, zt+1
m = ym+tεΩ.






= ym +( t − 1)εΩ +2 εΩ




(ﬂ y − ym) ≤ ﬂ y ≤ z
t
i.
















≥ ﬂ y − (ym +( t + 1)εΩ)
and









(ﬂ y − ym),
w h i c hi si n d e e dt h ec a s es i n c et +2≤ T ≤ n + 1.
One has z
T−1





m +2 εΩ = ym +( T − 1)εΩ ≤ ym + nεΩ < min
i
xi.
The last step from zT−1 to zT = x then corresponds to case 1. This achieves
the proof of the fact.
Step 2. We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. In case 1, Weak
Pareto implies zt+1 Pz t.L e t u s s h o w t h a t zt+1 Pz t also holds in case
2. Assume ￿rst that i and j have the same preferences, and that these
























i , and letting
{q ∈ R
‘
+ | qR i z
t+1
i } = {q ∈ R
‘









j)/2} = {q ∈ R
‘





One then has z
t+1
i Pi w since w2 <z
t+1















Let z0 be de￿ned by z0

















j)/2, one can apply Transfer Principle for Equals to i and j and
obtain that z00 Rz 0, where z00
i = w, z00
j = zt






20all other k. Now, by Weak Pareto, one has zt+1 Pz 00, so that, by transitivity,
zt+1 Pz t.
By Independence of Preferences for Proportional Allocations, this still
holds for any preferences of i and j.
Step 3. We have therefore proved that xPy ,which means that the SOF
satis￿es Maximin for Proportional Allocations. The result then follows from
the two lemmas.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :The proof consists in showing that Maximin for
Proportional Allocations must be satis￿ed as well. Let x and y be two allo-
cations proportional to Ω, such that mini xi > mini yi. Let a be an integer


























Let m be an agent such that ym =m i n i yi. Let R be the social ordering in
the initial economy with n agents, and R0 the social ordering in the economy
with n + a agents, where m is cloned a times.
Assume that yRx .Then, by repeated applications of Incremental Cloning,
(y1 + aε,...,yn + aε,y m + ε,...,ym + aε | {z }
a
) R (x1,...,xn,x m,...,x m | {z }
a
).
By Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations, one has
y
0 R (y1 + aε,...,yn + aε,y m + ε,...,y m + aε | {z }
a
),

















21By transitivity one has
y
0 R (x1,...,xn,x m,...,x m | {z }
a
)
but this contradicts the fact that y0
i < mini xi for all i,s ot h a tb yW e a k
Pareto, one actually has










+ | qR i xi
“
.
We ￿rst prove the following fact: Weak Pareto, Transfer Principle for
Equals and Hansson Independence imply the following property, named P
for further reference. Let x and y be two allocations proportional to Ω,a n d
i and j two agents with identical preferences denoted R0,s u c ht h a t
yi >x i >x j >y j,















The property is obvious if yi − xi ≤ xj − yj, a n dw ef o c u so nt h eh a r d








Let z =( yi1 − α1,x i2 + β2,...,xi‘ + β‘), and R0
0 be an individual preference









+ | q ≥ z
“
,
which is possible since z ￿ xi. Let R0 be the social ordering when agents i￿s
and j￿s preferences are changed to R0
0. By Hansson Independence, xRyif
and only if xR 0 y.
22Let y0 be de￿ned by y0
i = yi − α,y 0
j = yj + α, and y0
k = yk for all k 6= i,j.
By Transfer Principle for Equals, y0 R0 y. Let y00 be de￿ned by y00
i = z + β,
y00
j = y0
j + β, and y00
k = yk + 1





i. By Weak Pareto, y00 P0 y0.
Let x0 be de￿ned by x0
i = y00
i −α = z +β −α,x 0
j = y00
j +α = yj +2α+β,
and x0
k = y00
k for all k 6= i,j. By Transfer Principle for Equals, x0 R0 y00. But
x
0
i =( yi1 − α1,x i2 + β2,...,xi‘ + β‘)+β − α
=( yi1 + β1 − 2α1,x i2 +2 β2 − α2,...,xi‘ +2 β‘ − α‘)
and since xi2 +2 β2 − α2 <x i2, one has xi P0
0 x0





j = yj +2 α + β = yj +
3
4
(xj − yj) ¿ xj.
And x0
k ¿ xk for all k 6= i,j. Therefore, by Weak Pareto, one has xP 0 x0.
Summarizing, by transitivity, one has xR 0 y, and therefore xRy ,as was to
be proved. This achieves the proof of Property P.
The rest of the proof consists in showing that Property P combined with
Weak Pareto, Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations and Hans-
son Independence imply Maximin for Proportional Allocations. Let x and
y be two allocations proportional to Ω, such that mini xi > mini yi. Assume
that, contrary to Pazner-Schmeidler preferences, one has yRx .Let m be an
agent such that ym =m i n i yi. Let










Let x0 be de￿ned by x0
i =m i n i xi − ε for all i. Let y0 be proportional to
Ω and chosen so that for all i, y0
i >y i and for all i 6= m, y0
i > minixi while
y0
m = yi + 1
2ε. By Weak Pareto, y0 Pyand xPx 0. Then, by transitivity,
y0 Px 0.
Let y00 be de￿ned by y00
i = y0
i + ε for all i 6= m, and y00
m = yi + ε. Now, let
(R0
1,...,R0
n) be a pro￿le such that for all q ≥ y00





















i). Let R0 be the corresponding social ordering. By Hansson Indepen-
dence, one still has y0 R0 x0.A n db yW e a kP a r e t o ,y00 P 0 y0, so that y00 P 0 x0.
Let (R00
1,...,R00
























i ).Let R00 be the corresponding social
ordering. By Hansson Independence, one still has y00 R00 x0.























Let R0 be the social ordering for the uniform pro￿le (R0,...,R0). Consider the
allocation x00 de￿ned by x00
m = y00
m+ε = ym+2ε, and for all i 6= m, x00
i = x0
i+ε =
mini xi. Notice that for all i, ucR00
i (y00
i )=ucR0(y00




Therefore, by Hansson Independence, x00 R0 y00 if and only if x00 R00 y00.
By a repeated application of Property P (similarly as in step 1 of the proof
of Th. 2), one does have x00 R0 y00, so that x00 R00 y00. By transitivity, y00 R00 x0.






By Minimal Egalitarianism for Proportional Allocations, y∗ R00 y00 and by





















i for all i, yielding a contradiction with Weak Pareto.
Therefore one must have necessarily xRy(actually xPy ), proving
Maximin for Proportional Allocations.
24